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1 Introduction
Market efficiency is a central concern in economics. In idealized markets, trade is centralized
and information is perfect. In this case, the first welfare theorem shows that market outcomes are
efficient. However, trade is often decentralized: rather than trade taking place at a single price
that clears the market, in many markets buyers and sellers negotiate the terms of trade bilaterally.
Moreover, information is typically asymmetric: rather than buyers and sellers being perfectly, and
thus equally, informed, in many markets sellers often have better information about underlying
features of their assets than buyers.
It is well-known that both decentralized trade and asymmetric information can, by themselves,
hurt market efficiency. When trade is decentralized, it may take time for an agent to find a desirable
trading partner. This delay in trade represents a loss of efficiency. On the other hand, when sellers
are better informed about their assets than buyers, they can use their private information to extract
rents from buyers, distorting the terms of trade. This distortion also leads to a loss of efficiency.
A question that has attracted substantial attention is how decentralization of trade and asym-
metry of information interact to affect market efficiency. However, the literature on this topic has
mainly focused on the case in which asset values are independent across sellers, i.e., the value of
a seller’s asset is independent of the value of any other seller’s asset. While the assumption of
independent asset values is reasonable in some markets, there are many relevant markets, both real
and financial, in which asset values are correlated across sellers. Real-state markets and markets
for asset-backed securities are prominent examples.1
In this paper, we study market efficiency in decentralized markets with common value uncer-
tainty and correlated asset values. The environment we consider is as follows. There is an equal
mass of buyers and sellers. Payoffs from trade depend on an aggregate state, which only the sellers
know. Thus, asset values are perfectly correlated across sellers. The number of aggregate states is
finite and gains from trade are nonnegative in all states. Time is discrete and in every period buyers
1For instance, in the case of mortgage-backed securities, the loans in the underlying pool of loans backing different
securities could have been issued to borrowers with similar characteristics. In the housing market, sellers are typically
better informed about neighborhood characteristics than buyers, which affects house values; see Kurlat and Stroebel
(2015) for evidence on this.
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and sellers in the market are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs with some probability.
In a buyer-seller match, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller, which the seller
either accepts or rejects. If the seller accepts the offer, then trade takes place and both agents exit
the market. Otherwise, the match is dissolved and both agents remain in the market.
Our main result is that, somewhat surprisingly, welfare in any equilibrium approaches welfare
in the complete information case as trading frictions vanish, i.e., as the real time between two
consecutive trading opportunities converges to zero. Thus, by itself, asymmetry of information be-
tween buyers and sellers is not enough to prevent market efficiency when asset values are perfectly
correlated across sellers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section we discuss the
related literature. In Section 2 we introduce our environment. In Section 3 we explicitly construct
an equilibrium which achieves the first best in the limit as trading frictions vanish. In Section 4
we generalize the result of Section 3 and show that every equilibrium achieves the first best in the
limit as trading frictions vanish. In Section 5 we discuss robustness and extensions of our efficiency
result. In particular, we show that our efficiency result survives when we relax the assumption of
perfect correlation among asset values by introducing private values. In Section 6 we conclude.
The Appendix contains omitted details and proofs.
Related Literature The literature on market efficiency in decentralized markets with correlated
asset values is scant. Similarly to us, Blouin and Serrano (2001) study this question in a market
with aggregate uncertainty. There are important differences between our analysis and the analysis
in Blouin and Serrano’s paper, though. First, we focus on the case in which sellers know the
aggregate state but buyers do not. Second, we allow for any finite number of aggregate states,
instead of just two, and place no restrictions on payoffs from trade except that gains from trade
are nonnegative in every state. Finally, and crucially, we depart from Blouin and Serrano (2001)
in the bargaining protocol. They consider a stylized bargaining game which amounts to restricting
the set of prices at which trade can take place and show that market outcomes remain inefficient
even when trading frictions vanish. Our analysis thus shows that restricting prices at which trade
can take place can have a critical impact on market efficiency; when buyers are not restricted in the
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offers they can make, market outcomes become efficient as trading frictions vanish.2
Golosov, Lorenzoni, and Tsyvinski (2014) study information aggregation in decentralized mar-
kets with aggregate uncertainty and divisible goods. They provide conditions under which in the
long-run information is perfectly aggregated and trading outcomes become efficient.3 In contrast,
we show in an environment with indivisible goods that market efficiency is obtained as trading
frictions vanish. However, as we discuss in Section 4, equilibria need not aggregate information
perfectly in our setting.
Asriyan, Fuchs, and Green (2017a) study information spillovers in a dynamic market with
imperfectly correlated asset values in which sellers are privately informed about the quality of
their assets. They show that as long as asset values are sufficiently correlated, making transaction
outcomes public, i.e., introducing transaction transparency, leads to multiple equilibria which are
Pareto ranked. In our environment there are no information spillovers. The only way buyers can
learn about the aggregate state is through their own experience in the market.
There are a number of papers that study decentralized trade with common-value uncertainty and
independent asset values; see e.g., Blouin (2003), Camargo and Lester (2014), and Kim (2017).
Our efficiency result contrasts strongly with inefficiency results in this literature. When asset values
are independent, multiple types of assets co-exist in the market, allowing owners of lower-quality
assets to extract informational rents from buyers. This is not possible in the presence of aggregate
uncertainty. Our efficiency result also contrasts strongly with inefficiency results in the literature
on bargaining with common-value uncertainty; see, e.g., Deneckere and Liang (2006) and Gerardi,
Hörner, and Maestri (2014) for models of bargaining between two long-lived parties, and Hörner
and Vieille (2009), Daley and Green (2012), Fuchs, Öry, and Skrzypacz (2016), and Kaya and Kim
(2017) for models of bargaining between a long-lived seller and a sequence of short-lived buyers.
Intuitively, unlike in a single-seller setting, an individual seller cannot affect aggregate behavior in
2One can show that even when there is no asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers, if buyers are
restricted in the set of prices they can offer, then there exist equilibria in our environment which remain inefficient as
market frictions disappear. Serrano and Yosha (1995) obtain the same result in a stationary version of our environment.
3The seminal reference in the literature on information aggregation in decentralized markets is Wolinsky (1990).
Serrano and Yosha (1993) shows that Wolinsky’s negative result depends on the assumption of two-sided incomplete
information. Blouin and Serrano (2001) extends the analysis in Wolinsky (1990) to non-stationary environments.
Other recent papers in the literature on information aggregation in decentralized markets are Lauermann and Wolinsky
(2016) and Asriyan, Fuchs, and Green (2017b).
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a (large) market setting.
2 Environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. There is an equal mass of buyers and sellers with
common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1); trading frictions vanish as δ converges to one.4 Each seller can
produce one unit of an indivisible good and each buyer wants to consume one unit of the good. The
set of (aggregate) states is K = {1, . . . , K} and the probability that the state is k ∈ K is pik > 0.
Sellers know the state, but buyers do not. Agents have quasi-linear preferences. The value to a
buyer from consuming the good in state k is vk, while the cost to a seller of producing the good in
the same state is ck ≥ 0. We assume nonnegative gains from trade in every state.
Assumption 1. vk − ck ≥ 0 for all k ∈ K.
Assumption 1 is fairly weak. In particular, single-crossing preferences, i.e., vk − ck strictly
increasing in k, is not necessary for our results. Moreover, as we show in Section 4, Assumption 1
cannot be relaxed. It implies that the first-best welfare is
W ∗ =
K∑
k=1
pik(vk − ck).
Trade takes place as follows. In every period t ≥ 0, a buyer in the market is randomly and
anonymously matched to a seller with probability λ ∈ (0, 1) and vice-versa. In each buyer-seller
pair, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer p ∈ R+ to the seller. If the seller accepts the offer,
then trade occurs and both agents exit the market. Otherwise, the match is dissolved and both
agents remain in the market. The assumption that λ < 1 ensures that there is a positive mass of
agents in the market in every period.5
We now define strategies and equilibria. Let Ht, with typical element ht, be the set of private
histories for an agent in the market in period t.6 A behavior strategy for a buyer is a sequence
4More formally, one can think that agents discount the future at a common rate ρ > 0 and δ = e−ρ∆, where ∆ is
the time interval between two consecutive periods. Trading frictions vanish as ∆ converges to zero.
5In Section 5 we discuss how to extend our analysis to the case in which λ = 1.
6A private history for a buyer in the market in period t is a sequence ht = (p˜1, . . . , p˜t−1), where p˜s ∈ R+ is the
buyer’s (rejected) price offer in period s if he was matched in this period and p˜s = ∅ if the buyer was not matched in
period s. Private histories for sellers are defined similarly.
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σB = {σBt }, where σBt : Ht → ∆(R+) and σBt (ht) is the (random) price offer that the buyer
makes in period t if he is matched to a seller when his private history is ht. A behavior strategy
for a seller is a sequence σS = {σSt }, where σSt : Ht × K × R+ → [0, 1] and σSt (ht, k, p) is the
probability that the seller accepts an offer of p in period t when the state is k and his private history
is ht. A belief system for a buyer is a sequence µ = {µt}, where µt : Ht → ∆(K) and µt(ht) is
the buyer’s (posterior) belief about the state in period t when his private history is ht. We let Σ and
θ denote, respectively, a strategy profile and a profile of belief systems. We consider pairs (Σ, θ)
which constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
We conclude by showing how to compute welfare for any strategy profile. An outcome for a
seller is a triple (k,T,p), where k ∈ K is the aggregate state, T ∈ Z+ ∪ {∞} is the time at which
the seller trades, and p ∈ P is the price at which the seller trades; T = ∞ corresponds to the
event in which the seller does not trade.7 Together with the probability distribution over the set of
aggregate states, a strategy profile Σ uniquely determines a probability distribution ξ over the set
of outcomes for each seller. Let Eξ denote the expectation with respect to ξ. Welfare under the
strategy profile Σ is
W (Σ) =
K∑
k=1
pikEξ
[
δT|k] (vk − ck);
the term Eξ
[
δT|k] is the discounted probability of trade in aggregate state k. Clearly, W (Σ) is
bounded above by W ∗.
3 A Limit-Efficient Equilibrium
In our environment the first best is incentive feasible.8 The question of interest is whether the
outcome of decentralized trade always approaches the first best as trading frictions vanish. In this
section we show that if discounting is sufficiently small, then there exists a PBE whose welfare
approaches the first-best welfare as δ converges to one. For ease of exposition, we consider the
case of two aggregate states and discuss how to extend our equilibrium construction to the case of
7When T =∞, the seller’s transaction price is undetermined. We adopt the convention that p = 0 in this case.
8Indeed, the direct mechanism in which trade occurs at price p(k¯) = 12 (vk¯ + ck¯) if, and only if, the average
reported state k belongs to K is incentive compatible and individually rational. Truth-telling is immediate since no
seller is pivotal when there are three or more of them in the population.
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more than two aggregate states at the end of the section.
Assume, without any loss, that c1 < c2 and refer to a seller when the aggregate state is k as
a type-k seller.9 Consider the following symmetric assessment (Σ, θ): (i) a type-k seller accepts
an offer of p if, and only if, p ≥ ck; (ii) a buyer offers p = c1 the first time he is matched to a
seller and offers p = c2 afterwards; and (iii) a buyer in the market assigns probability pi1 to k = 1
if either he has not made any offer or the highest offer he has made is less than c1, otherwise he
assigns probability 0 to k = 1. Under Σ, all buyers trade after at most two offers, and so welfare
approaches the first-best welfare as trading frictions vanish.
We claim that there exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that (Σ, θ) is a PBE if δ ≥ δ∗. First notice that
buyer beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule on the path of play. Moreover, sellers’ behavior is
sequentially rational. Clearly, a type-2 seller has no incentive to deviate. A type-1 seller also has no
incentive to deviate by rejecting an offer p ≥ c1. Indeed, a type-1 seller who rejects an offer knows
that in the future he is matched with probability 1 to a buyer who has not had the chance to make
an offer (and so will offer p = c1). Finally, notice that the only possibly profitable deviation for a
buyer is to offer a price p ≥ c2 and trade immediately if the highest price he has offered so far is
smaller than c1. The expected payoff from this deviation is bounded above by u = pi1v1+pi2v2−c2.
On the other hand, if the highest price offer a buyer has made so for is smaller than c1, then the
buyer’s expected payoff from following the equilibrium strategy is
pi1(v1 − c1) + pi2δ
∞∑
s=0
δs(1− λ)sλ(v2 − c2) = pi1(v1 − c1) + pi2 δλ
1− δ(1− λ)(v2 − c2),
which is greater than u as long as δ is sufficiently close to one. This establishes the desired result.
We conclude this section by discussing how to extend the above equilibrium construction to
the case in which there are more than two aggregate states. We provide a sketch of the argument
in what follows; the details are in the Appendix. Let C be the set of possible production costs for
sellers. Then C = {c1, . . . , cL}, with L ≤ K and c1 < · · · < cL. Now consider the symmetric
strategy profile in which buyers and sellers behave as follows: (i) a type-k seller accepts an offer of
p if, and only if p ≥ ck; and (ii) a buyer offers c1 the first time he is matched to a seller and offers
9By re-ordering the states if necessary, we have that c1 ≤ c2. When c1 = c2, it is immediate to see that there exists
a symmetric PBE where buyers offer p = c1 when matched to a seller and sellers accept and offer of p if, and only if,
p ≥ c1. Welfare in this equilibrium approaches the first-best welfare as trading frictions vanish.
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the smallest element in C that is greater than the greatest offer he has made so far any other time
he is matched to a seller. Notice that on the path of play a buyer offers ck, with k ∈ {1, . . . , L}, the
kth time he is matched to a seller and trades after making at most L offers. So, welfare approaches
the first-best welfare as trading frictions vanish. This strategy profile reduces to the strategy profile
of the PBE we constructed above when there are two aggregate states.
As in the case with two aggregate states, the sellers’ behavior is sequentially rational in the
strategy profile under consideration, and for the same reason: with probability one, a type-k seller
who rejects an offer of p ≥ ck receives an offer of at most ck in any subsequent period. Likewise,
the only profitable deviation for a buyer is to offer a price that is higher than the price he is supposed
to offer in order to increase the probability of trade. In the Appendix we show that there exists a
(symmetric) belief system consistent with Bayes’ rule on the path of play such that the buyers’
behavior is also sequentially rational if they are patient enough. The intuition is straightforward:
in order for a buyer to increase his probability of trade in any period, he needs to increase the price
he offers by a discontinuous amount, which does not pay when trading frictions are small enough,
as the buyer trades with probability one after making at most L offers.
4 Market Efficiency
In Section 3 we constructed a PBE that approaches the first best as trading frictions vanish. This,
of course, does not rule out the possibility that there are PBE whose welfare is bounded away from
W ∗ no matter how small trading frictions are. In this section we show that this is not the case.
Theorem 1. Let {δn} be a sequence of discount factors such that limn δn = 1. For any sequence
{(Σn, θn)} such that (Σn, θn) is a PBE when δ = δn, the sequence {W (Σn)} converges to W ∗.
In what follows we present a sketch of the proof of Theorem 1. For simplicity, we consider the
limiting case in which λ is close enough to one that the probability that a buyer who stays in the
market is matched to a seller is essentially equal to one.10 The proof of the general case—when
10Formally, we show that if {δn} and {λn} are, respectively, a sequence of discount factors and a sequence of
matching probabilities such that limn δn = limn λn = 1, then limnW (Σn) = W ∗ for any sequence {(Σn, θn)} such
that (Σn, θn) is a PBE when δ = δn and λ = λn.
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λ assumes any value in (0, 1)—is in the Appendix; we discuss how to extend the argument that
follows to the general case at the end of the section.
Let (Σ, θ) be a PBE when the discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1). Notice that even though (Σ, θ) need
not be symmetric, all agents on a given side of the market obtain the same payoff; this property
of equilibria holds regardless of the value of λ. In fact, since there is a continuum of buyers and
matching is random and anonymous, a buyer can obtain the same payoff as any other buyer by
mimicking the other buyer’s behavior. The same applies for sellers. Let V B be the buyers’ ex-ante
equilibrium payoff and V k be the type-k seller’s equilibrium payoff. Moreover, let V kt be the type-
k sellers’ payoff in period t; by construction, V t0 = V
k. Since sellers know the aggregate state, V kt
does not depend on the private history of a seller, only on the period t.
Now observe that for every k ∈ K and s > t ≥ 0, we have that V kt ≥ δs−tV ks . This follows
immediately from the fact that a possibility for a seller in period t is to reject all offers between
periods t and s−1, and then follow the equilibrium strategy from period s on. Moreover, for every
k ∈ K and t ≥ 0, we have that V kt ≤ z = maxk vk. This follows from the fact buyers do not find
it optimal to offer p > z on the path of play if such an offer is accepted with positive probability.
Both these facts about the payoffs V kt hold regardless of λ.
We proceed in three steps. First, we construct prices pˆ1 to pˆK such that for all k ∈ K a type-k
seller accepts an offer of pˆk in the first K periods. Then, we use these "reservation" prices to
construct a lower bound to V B. Finally, we use the lower bound to V B to construct a lower bound
to W (Σ) that is independent of Σ and show that the lower bound converges to the first-best welfare
as δ converges to one.
Step 1. Reservation Prices for Sellers
Fix ε > 0 and let T ≥ K. For the argument that follows it suffices to set T = K. Letting T
be arbitrary helps us when we discuss the extension of our argument to the case in which λ can
assume any value in (0, 1). Now, for each k ∈ K, let
pˆk = ck +
V k1
δT−2
+
ε
4
.
We claim that a type-k seller accepts an offer of pˆk in the first T − 1 periods. Indeed, it is strictly
optimal for a type-k seller to accept an offer of p in period t if p − ck > δV kt+1. Now observe that
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if t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, then V k1 ≥ δtV kt+1 ≥ δT−1V kt+1. Hence, t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} implies that
pˆk − ck ≥ δV kt+1 + ε/4 > δV kt+1, and so a type-k seller accepts an offer of pˆk in period t.
Step 2. Lower Bound to Buyers’ Payoff
Re-label the aggregate states so that pˆk is (weakly) increasing in k. Consider now the following
alternative strategy σˆB for a buyer: offer pˆt+1 if matched to a seller in period t ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1}
and offer pˆK if matched to a seller in period t ≥ K. Denote by u(σˆB; (Σ, θ)) the payoff to a buyer
who follows σˆB when all other agents behave according to Σ and the belief system is θ. Since
λ ≈ 1, the buyer transacts with probability essentially equal to one in at most K ≤ T periods and
pays at most pˆk for the good when the aggregate state is k. Thus, a lower bound to the buyer’s
payoff in aggregate state k when he follows σˆB is δT−1vk − pˆk − ε/4, and so
u(σˆB; (Σ, θ)) =
K∑
k=1
pik
(
δT−1vk − pˆk
)− ε
4
=
K∑
k=1
pik
(
δT−1vk − ck
)− 1
δT−2
K∑
k=1
pikV
k
1 −
ε
2
.
Given that (Σ, θ) is an equilibrium, V B ≥ u(σˆB; (Σ, θ)), otherwise buyers would have a prof-
itable deviation. Consequently,
V B ≥
K∑
k=1
pik(vk − ck)− (1− δT−1)
K∑
k=1
pikvk − 1
δT−2
K∑
k=1
pikV
k
1 −
ε
2
≥ W ∗ − (1− δT−1)z − 1
δT−1
K∑
k=1
pikV
k − ε
2
.
where the second inequality follows from the fact that V k ≤ z = maxk vk and V k = V k0 ≥ δV k1
for every aggregate state k.
Step 3. Lower Bound to Welfare
Since preferences are quasi-linear,
W (Σ) = V B +
K∑
k=1
pikV
k.
Thus, from Step 2 and using again the fact that V k ≤ z for all k ∈ K, we have that
W (Σ) ≥ W ∗ − (1− δT−1)
(
z +
z
δT−1
)
− ε
2
.
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Consequently, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that W (Σ) ≥ W ∗ − ε if δ ≥ δ. The desired result
follows from the fact that ε is arbitrary.
Extending the above argument to the case in which λ is bounded away from one requires
changing the strategy σˆB used to compute the lower bound to the buyers’ equilibrium payoff to
account for the fact that a buyer might not be matched to a seller in every period. Loosing speaking,
when λ is bounded away from one, the strategy σˆB must be such that a buyer first attempts to
trade with the type of seller with the lowest reservation price for sufficiently many periods, then
attempts to trade with the type of seller with the second lowest reservation price for sufficiently
many periods, and so on. This requires taking T in the above definition of reservation prices to
be large enough. In the limit as δ converges to one, the delay in trading implied by the modified
strategy σˆB converges to zero and one still obtains a lower bound to the equilibrium welfare that is
independent of the equilibrium under play and converges to the first-best welfare. The details are
in the Appendix. We conclude this section with a couple of remarks about our results.
Role of Aggregate Uncertainty and Random Matching. Our efficiency result contrasts strongly
with inefficiency results in dynamic decentralized markets with common-value uncertainty but un-
correlated asset values. In such environments, multiple types of seller co-exist in the market. As
is well-known, the incentive that sellers with low valuation have to mimic the behavior of sellers
with high valuation ensures that equilibria remain inefficient even as trading frictions vanish—a
reduction in delay costs reduces the cost for the former type of seller to imitate the latter type of
seller. In our environment, a single type of seller is present in the market at any point in time.
As such, an option for a buyer is to offer the reservation prices of the different types of sellers
in ascending order, thus extracting the residual surplus from sellers in a finite number of periods
regardless of the aggregate state. In the limit as δ converges to one, the inefficiency resulting from
this strategy converges to zero. Since the buyer’s payoff in any equilibrium is bounded below by
the payoff they obtain using the strategy described above, all equilibria become efficient as trading
frictions vanish.
Some of the driving forces present in our model with a continuum of agents are also not present
in bargaining models in which a single seller dynamically meets a with a sequence of short-run
11
buyers or the same buyer. The main difference between our model and the aforementioned ones is
that in our environment a single trader cannot influence the aggregate dynamics of the economy.
On the other hand, when there is a single seller in the market, his behavior can affect the future
behavior of buyers. In this case, the only way to provide incentives for a low-valuation seller to
trade at a low price is to have delay in trade with a high-valuation seller.
Information Aggregation. A question that has attracted a lot of attention is whether markets
fully aggregate the information dispersed among agents. While the equilibrium of Section 3 ag-
gregates information perfectly, it is easy to construct examples of PBE which become efficient in
the limit as trading frictions vanish but fail to aggregate information perfectly. For instance, in the
case of three aggregate states, if pi1v1 + pi2v2 + pi3v3 < c3 but
v˜ =
pi2
pi2 + pi3
v2 +
pi3
pi2 + pi3
v3 > c3,
then as long δ is close to one there exists a PBE such that: (i) buyers offer c1 the first time they are
matched to a seller, and type-1 sellers accept this offer; and (ii) buyers make the pooling offer v˜
any other time they are matched to a seller, and type-2 and type-3 sellers accept this offer.
5 Robustness and Extensions
In this section we discuss robustness and extensions of our efficiency result.
Gains From Trade. Theorem 1 shows that the assumption of nonnegative gains from trade in
every state is sufficient for welfare in all PBE to approach the first-best welfare as trading frictions
disappear. The example below shows that this assumption is also necessary for limit efficiency.
Suppose that K = 2 and v1 < c1 < c2 < v2, so that gains from trade are negative when k = 1.
In this case, W ∗ = pi2(v2 − c2). Take a sequence {δn} of discount factors that converges to one
and, for each n ∈ N, let (Σn, θn) be a PBE when δ = δn. Assume towards a contradiction that
W (Σn) converges to W ∗. Then limn Eξn
[
δTn |k = 1
]
= 0 and limn Eξn
[
δTn |k = 2
]
= 1, where
ξn is the probability distribution over the set of outcomes induced by Σn. Now let Q be the first
(random) period in which a buyer makes an offer p ≥ c2. Then limn Eξn
[
δQn |k = 2
]
= 1. It is
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possible to show that limn Eξn
[
δTn |k = 1
]
= 0 and limEξn
[
δQn |k = 2
]
= 1 together imply that
limn Eξn
[
δQn |k = 1
]
= 1. So, a seller in state 1 can secure a limit payoff of at least c2 − c1 > 0 by
following the strategy in which he accepts an offer p if, and only if, p ≥ c2, a contradiction.
Bargaining Protocol. It is possible to extend Theorem 1 to the case in which in every buyer-
seller pair the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller with positive probability. A
sketch of the proof—which is similar to the proof of Theorem 1—is as follows. We again consider
the limiting case in which λ is close enough to one that the probability that a buyer in the market
is matched to a seller is essentially equal to one; the extension to the case in which λ is bounded
away from one is the same as in the previous section. A lower bound to a buyer’s payoff in any
equilibrium is obtained when the buyer: (i) rejects any offer that he receives from a seller; and
(ii) offers the type-k seller’s reservation price in the kth period in which the buyer gets to make
an offer. This strategy ensures that the buyer trades after making at most K offers to sellers. As
trading frictions vanish, this lower bound on the buyers’s equilibrium payoff converges to the first-
best welfare net of the sellers’ ex-ante equilibrium payoff, which establishes the desired result.
Theorem 1 is not true when sellers have all the bargaining power, though. Signalling opens up
the possibility of equilibria which remain inefficient even as trading frictions vanish.
Uninformed Sellers. We assume that all sellers are informed about the aggregate state. As it
turns out, this assumption cannot be relaxed. When some sellers are uninformed about the aggre-
gate state, it is possible to construct equilibria in which signalling sustains inefficient outcomes
even as trading frictions vanish: a buyer who deviates by making an offer to attract an uninformed
seller changes the uninformed seller’s belief in a way that precludes trade.
Matching Probabilities We can extend Theorem 1 to the case in which λ = 1, and so in every
period all buyers and sellers in the market are matched in pairs with probability one. In this case,
however, we need to consider the stronger concept of sequential equilibrium. This is the natural
equilibrium concept to consider when λ = 1, as in any sequential equilibrium the payoffs to buyers
and sellers are well-defined even if there is a zero mass of agents in the market. In particular, the
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payoff to a buyer or a seller is well-defined if aggregate behavior is such that the market clears but
the agent behaves in a such a way that he does not trade.11
Since the existence of a sequential equilibrium cannot be guaranteed when action sets are
infinite, we make the additional assumption that buyers are restricted to make offers in a finite
grid P = {p0, p1, . . . , pM} of prices, where pi is strictly increasing in i, p0 < mink ck, and pM >
maxk ck.12 The assumption that p0 < mink ck is natural, as it implies that buyers can make offers
that are always rejected. The assumption that buyers can make offers that are greater than the
highest cost of production is also natural; otherwise, it is trivial to generate inefficient equilibria.
For any price grid P , let C(P ) = max0∈{1,...,M−1} |pi+1−pi| be the coarseness of P . Our efficiency
result is obtained in the limit as C(P ) converges to zero, and so the grid of possible price offers
becomes arbitrarily fine. This limiting case approaches the case in which buyers are not restricted
in the offers they can make to sellers.
Theorem 2. Let {δn} be a sequence of discount factors such that limn δn = 1 and {Pn} be a
sequence of finite price grids such that minPn < mink ck and maxPn > maxk vk for all n ∈ N
and limn C(Pn) = 0. For any sequence {(Σn, θn)} such that (Σn, θn) is a sequential equilibrium
when δ = δn and P = Pn, the sequence {W (Σn)} converges to W ∗.
The proof of the above theorem is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and thus is omitted.
Loosely speaking, when buyers are restricted to make offers in a finite set P , the reservation prices
used to derive a lower bound to the buyers’ equilibrium payoff need to be adjusted so that they
are elements of P . As C(P ) converges to zero, this adjustment becomes arbitrarily small and one
obtains a lower bound to the buyers’ equilibrium payoff that approaches the lower bound we obtain
when buyers are not restricted in the offers they can make.
Private Values We assume that asset values are perfectly correlated across buyers and sellers. It
turns out that this assumption is not necessary for our results. As we now discuss, an efficiency
11Indeed, first notice that if the pair (Σ, θ) is such that Σ has full support, then there is a positive mass of agents
in the market in every period, in which case payoffs are well-defined after any history. Now observe that payoffs in a
sequential equilibrium are the limits of payoffs when the pair (Σ, θ) is such that Σ has full support.
12A straightforward fixed-point argument shows that a sequential equilibrium exists when buyers are restricted to
make offers in a finite price grid.
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result is possible when asset values have a common- and a private-value component.
The environment is the same as before, except that now buyers and sellers have idiosyncratic
tastes. The set of possible buyer types is D = {1, . . . , D}, with D ≥ 1, while the set of possible
seller types is L = {1, . . . , L}, with L ≥ 1. We denote a typical element of D by d and a typical
element of L by `. An agent’s type is his private information and is independent of any other
agent’s type. The probability that a buyer is of type d is ϕd ∈ [0, 1], while the probability that a
seller is of type ` when the aggregate state is k is γk` ∈ [0, 1]. The payoff to a type-d buyer from
consuming the good in state k is vk,d, while the cost to a type-` seller of producing the good in state
k is ck,`. As in the setting of Theorem 1, we assume nonnegative gains from trade in every state, in
which case the first-best welfare is given by
W ∗ =
K∑
k=1
L∑
`=1
D∑
d=1
pikγ
k
` ϕd(vk,d − ck,`).
Assumption 2. vk,d − ck,` ≥ 0 for all (k, d, `) ∈ K ×D × L.
It is possible to extend Theorem 1 to the case described here.13 While the idea behind this more
general efficiency result is similar to the idea behind Theorem 1, the proof needs to be adapted to
take into account the fact that when there is more than one type of seller in each aggregate state,
these different types of seller can exit the market at different rates in equilibrium.
6 Concluding Remarks
Most of the literature that studies the impact of asymmetric information on market efficiency in
decentralized markets with common-value uncertainty focuses on the case of independent asset
values. In this paper, we show that allowing correlated asset values—a more realistic assumption
in many relevant markets—can lead to starkly different results. While our assumption of perfectly
correlated asset values is strong, it constitutes a useful first step in relaxing the assumption of
independent asset values. The question of how asymmetric information affects market efficiency
in decentralized markets with common-value uncertainty and imperfectly correlated asset values
remains an important open question.
13The proof is available from the authors upon request.
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7 Appendix
In this Appendix we first extend the equilibrium construction of Section 3 to the case of any finite
number of aggregate states. We then provide the proof of Theorem 1 in the general case in which
λ can assume any value in (0, 1).
Equilibrium of Section 3
Let C = {c1, . . . , cL}, with c1 < · · · < cL and L ≤ K, be the set of possible production costs for
sellers and define f : C ⇒ K to be the correspondence such that f(c`) = {k ∈ K : ck = c`}. Now
consider the symmetric assessment (Σ, θ) in which the sellers’ strategy, the buyers’ strategy, and
the buyers’ belief system are as follows:
Sellers’ Strategy σS: A type-k seller in a match accepts an offer p if, and only if, p ≥ ck.
Buyers’ Strategy σB: For any history ht for a buyer, let: (i) m(ht) ∈ N+ be the number of times
the buyer was matched in the market so far; (ii) p(ht) be the largest offer the buyer has made so
far, where p(ht) = −∞ if m(ht) = 0; and (iii) C(p(ht)) = {c ∈ C : c > p(ht)}. Notice that
C(p(ht)) = C if m(ht) = 0. A buyer’s behavior after a history ht is as follows. If C(p(ht)) 6= ∅,
then the buyer offers the smallest element of C(p(ht)) if he is matched in the market. If, instead,
C(p(ht)) = ∅, then the buyer offers cL if he is matched in the market.
Buyers’ Belief System µB: If m(ht) = 0, then µ(ht) assigns probability pik to k ∈ K. Now suppose
that m(ht) > 0. If C(p(ht)) 6= ∅, then C(p(ht)) = {cj, . . . , cL} for some j ∈ {1, . . . , L}. In this
case, µ(ht) assigns probability 0 to every k ∈ ⋃j−1s=1 f(cs) and assigns probability
pik∑
`∈⋃Ls=j f(cs) pi`
to every other aggregate state. On the other hand, if C(p(ht)) = ∅, then µ(ht) assigns probability 0
to every k ∈ ⋃L−1s=1 f(cs) and assigns probability
pik∑
`∈f(cL) pi`
to the remaining aggregate states.
We claim that there exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that (Σ, θ) is a PBE if δ > δ∗. It is easy to see
that µ is consistent with Bayes’ rule on the path of play. The same argument as in the case of
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two aggregate states shows that σS is sequentially rational regardless of δ: with probability one, a
type-k seller who rejects an offer in a given period receives no offer greater than ck in the future.
Consider now a buyer with history ht. From above, there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that µ(ht)
assigns probability
pik =
pik∑
`∈⋃Ls=j f(cs) pi`
to every aggregate state k ∈ ⋃Ls=j f(cs) and assigns probability 0 to every other aggregate state.
If j = L, then the buyer does not have a profitable deviation as he believes that k ∈ f(cL) and
expects that any seller accepts an offer of cL. Suppose then that j < L and let τ ≥ L − 1 be the
random time at which the buyer is matched for the Lth time in the market. If the buyer follows the
equilibrium strategy, then his expected payoff is bounded below by
uj =
∑
`∈⋃Lk=j f(ck) E[δτ−1]pi`(v` − c`).
Clearly, the most profitable deviation for the buyer consists in offering a price ck ∈ {cj+1, . . . , cL}
to trade earlier. The payoff from this deviation is bounded above by
u′j =
∑
`∈⋃Lk=j f(ck) pi`(v` − c`)︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
−E[δτ−1](cj+1 − cj)
∑
`∈f(cj) pi`︸ ︷︷ ︸
ε
.
The payoff u is the agent’s expected payoff from trading immediately at the correct price, while
ε is a lower bound to the agent’s expected loss from trading at a higher price; with probability at
least
∑
`∈f(cj) pi` there is an aggregate state in which the buyer purchases the good at a price at least
(cj+1− cj) > 0 greater than cj . Since limδ→1 E[δτ−1] = 1 by the dominated convergence theorem,
there exists δj ∈ (0, 1) such that δ > δj implies that uj > u′j .
Letting δ∗ = max{δ1, . . . , δL−1}, we can then conclude that σB is sequentially rational when-
ever δ > δ∗, and so (Σ, θ) is a PBE if δ > δ∗. Given that under Σ the buyers trade after at most L
offers, it follows that limδ→1W (Σ) = W ∗.
Proof of Theorem 1
We show that for all ε ∈ (0, z), there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that if δ > δ, then W (Σ) > W ∗− ε for
every assessment (Σ, θ) which constitutes a PBE when the agents’ discount factor is δ. Recall that
z = maxk vk.
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Fix ε ∈ (0, z) and let (Σ, θ) be a PBE for some discount factor δ. We know from the main
text that buyers obtain the same payoff V B and each type k of seller obtains the same payoff V k.
Moreover, if we let V kt denote a type-k seller’s payoff in period t, then this payoff does not depend
on a seller’s private history. Finally, the payoffs V kt are such that: (i) V
k
t ≥ δs−tV ks for every k ∈ K
and s > t ≥ 0; and (ii) V kt ≤ z for every k ∈ K and t ≥ 0.
Step 1. Reservation Prices for Sellers
We proceed as in the main text and first identify for each k ∈ K a set of offers that, in equi-
librium, a type-k seller accepts with probability one. Let κ = ε/16z > 0 and define T (κ) as the
smallest positive integer such that (1− λ)T (κ) < κ.
Lemma 1. Consider the equilibrium (Σ, θ). For every k ∈ K and t ≥ 0, let
p
k,t
= ck +
V k1
δt−1
.
If a type-k seller receives an offer p > p
k,t
in period t, then he accepts it with probability one.
Proof. Consider a type-k seller in period t ≥ 0. He accepts an offer of p if p − ck > δV kt+1. The
desired result follows from the fact that p
k,t
− ck = V k1 /δt−1 ≥ δV kt+1, where the inequality follows
from the fact that V tt ≥ δtV kt+1 for all k ∈ K and t ≥ 0.
Now, for each k ∈ K, define p̂k to be such that
pˆk = ck +
V k1
δT (κ)K−2
+
ε
4
.
Since, by construction, pˆk > pk,t for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T (κ)K − 1}, Lemma 1 implies that a type-k
seller accepts an offer of pˆk in any period t ∈ {0, . . . , T (κ)K − 1}.
Step 2. Lower Bound to Buyers’ Payoff
As in the main text, we now use the prices pˆ1 to pˆK to derive a lower bound to the buyers’
equilibrium payoff. Re-label the aggregate states so that pˆk is (weakly) increasing in k. Consider
the following alternative strategy σˆB for a buyer: offer pˆk if matched to a seller in periods t ∈
{T (κ)(k − 1), . . . , T (κ)k − 1} and offer pˆK if matched to a seller in any period t ≥ T (κ)K.
Denote by u
(
σˆB; (Σ, θ)
)
the payoff the buyer obtains when all other agents behave according to
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the strategy profile Σ and the belief system is θ. Notice that V B ≥ u (σ̂B; (Σ, θ)), otherwise the
buyer would have a profitable deviation.
We obtain a lower bound for u
(
σˆB; (Σ, θ)
)
, and thus V B, as follows. Suppose the aggregate
state is k. There are two mutually exclusive and exhaustive events to consider: the buyer transacts
in period t < T (κ)(k−1) or the buyer is still in the market in period T (κ)(k−1). In the first event,
the buyer’s expected payoff is bounded below by δT (κ)K−1vk − pˆk; this is because pˆk is increasing
in k and vk ≥ 0. Consider now the second event. Either the buyer is matched with a seller in
some period t ∈ {T (κ)(k − 1), . . . , T (κ)k − 1} and obtains a payoff of at least δT (κ)K−1vk − pˆk,
or the buyer is not matched with a seller in any of these periods and obtains a payoff of a least
−pˆK . Given that (1 − λ)T (κ) < κ, the probability the buyer does not meet a seller in some period
t ∈ {T (κ)(k − 1), . . . , T (κ)k − 1} is at most κ. So, the buyer’s expected payoff in the second
event is bounded below by (1 − κ) (δT (κ)K−1vk − p̂k) − κp̂K . Given that the lower bound to the
buyers’ expected payoff is lower in the second event, we then have that
u
(
σˆB; (Σ, θ)
) ≥ (1− κ) K∑
k=1
pik
(
δT (κ)K−1vk − pˆk
)− κpˆK .
Now observe that maxk
{
ck, V
k
1
} ≤ z and ε ∈ (0, z) implies that
κpˆK ≤ κ
(
ck + V
K
1 + ε+
(
1− δT (κ)K−2)V K1
δT (κ)K−2
)
≤ 3κz + z
(
1− δT (κ)K−2
δT (κ)K−2
)
. (1)
Moreover, we also have that
(1− κ)
K∑
k=1
pik
(
δT (κ)K−1vk − pˆk
)
= (1− κ)
K∑
k=1
pik
(
δT (κ)K−1vk − ck − δV
k
1
δT (κ)K−1
− ε
4
)
= (1− κ)
[
K∑
k=1
pik(vk − ck)−
(
1− δT (κ)K−1) K∑
k=1
pikvk − ε
4
−
K∑
k=1
pik
δV k1
δT (κ)K−1
]
≥
K∑
k=1
pik(vk − ck)− κ
K∑
k=1
pikvk −
(
1− δT (κ)K−1) K∑
k=1
pikvk − ε
4
−
K∑
k=1
pik
δV k1
δT (κ)K−1
≥
K∑
k=1
pik(vk − ck)− κz −
(
1− δT (κ)K−1) z − ε
4
− z
(
1− δT (κ)K−1
δT (κ)K−1
)
−
K∑
k=1
pikδV
k
1 ; (2)
the first inequality follows from the fact that ck, vk, and V k1 are non-negative for all k ∈ K, while
the second inequality follows from the fact that
∑K
k=1 pikvk ≤ z and
∑K
k=1 pikδV
k
1 ≤ z.
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Using inequalities (1) and (2) and the facts that 4κz = ε/4 and (1 − δt)/δt is increasing in t,
we can then conclude that
V B ≥ W ∗ −
K∑
k=1
pikδV
k
1 −
(
1− δT (κ)K−1) z − ε
2
− 2z
(
1− δT (κ)K−1
δT (κ)K−1
)
.
Step 3. Lower Bound to Welfare
We conclude by using the above lower bound to V B to obtain a lower bound to welfare. Since
W (Σ) = V B +
∑K
k=1 pikV
k and, for all k ∈ K, V k = V k0 ≥ δV k1 , we have
W (Σ) ≥ W ∗ − (1− δT (κ)K−1) z − ε
2
− 2z
(
1− δT (κ)K−1
δT (κ)K−1
)
.
Taking δ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ > δ implies that
(
1− δT (κ)K−1) z + 2z(1− δT (κ)K−1
δT (κ)K−1
)
<
ε
2
,
we can then conclude that W (σ, µ) > W ∗ − ε whenever δ > δ. The desired result follows from
the fact that ε was arbitrary.
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